This paper develops algorithms for dynamically consistent updating of ambiguous beliefs in the maxmin expected utility model of decision making under ambiguity. Dynamic consistency is the requirement that ex-ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Such updating, in this context, implies dependence on the feasible set of payoff vectors available in the problem and/or on an ex-ante optimal act for the problem. Despite this complication, the algorithms are formulated concisely and are easy to implement, thus making dynamically consistent updating operational in the presence of ambiguity.
Introduction
A central task facing any theory of decision making under uncertainty is updating preferences in response to new information (see e.g., [35] ). Since updated preferences govern future choices, it is important to know how they relate to information contingent choices made ex-ante. Dynamic consistency is the requirement that ex-ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences (see [10] for a formal definition of dynamic consistency and a detailed discussion of its relation to other dynamic consistency concepts in the decision theory literature). This consistency is implicit in the standard way of thinking about a dynamic choice problem as equivalent to a single ex-ante choice to which one is committed, and is thus ubiquitous in decision analysis.
Under subjective expected utility (EU), updating preferences by applying Bayes' rule to the subjective probability is the standard way to update. Why is this so? Dynamic consistency is the primary justification for Bayesian updating. Not only does Bayesian updating imply dynamic consistency, but, if updating consists of specifying a conditional probability measure for each (non-null) event, dynamic consistency implies these conditional measures must be the Bayesian updates. Even under the view that Bayesian updating should be taken as given, this tells us that dynamic consistency comes ''for free'' under EU.
The study of dynamic consistency is in a well defined sense the study of optimal updating, as dynamically consistent update rules result in maximal (ex-ante) welfare. Moreover, since dynamic consistency leads to a well-established theory of updating under expected utility, it makes sense to ask what it implies for the updating of more general preferences. In a recent paper [10] , Hanany and Klibanoff pursued this strategy to update preferences of the max-min expected utility (MEU) form [6] . For these preferences, beliefs are ambiguous in the sense that they are represented by a (compact and convex) set of 0888-613X/$ -see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2011.06.010 probability measures, rather than the usual single measure of EU, and acts are evaluated by the minimum expected utility generated by these measures. MEU preferences are widely used in modeling ambiguity averse behavior, as exemplified by the famous [3] paradoxes (for a survey of economic applications of MEU see [20] ). The objective of this paper is to offer ways to explicitly compute the decision maker's (DM's) updated beliefs according to the update rules suggested by Hanany and Klibanoff [10] , thus making these rules operational. For each rule, the updated ambiguous beliefs are computed using constructive algorithms. The algorithms we describe allow explicit implementation of these rules, for example via computer programs. The rules allow the dynamically consistent updating of any set of MEU beliefs upon observing any non-null event. These rules all are generalizations of Bayesian updating in the sense that they specialize to Bayes' rule when the set of measures is a singleton. In common with Bayesian updating and many other models, our approach does not address preferences conditional on completely unanticipated (i.e., null) events. Similarly, it does not consider costs, cognitive or otherwise, of describing events. For a discussion of these and other aspects of dynamic decisions see, e.g., [9, 19, 25] .
To better understand the issues involved in dynamically consistent updating under ambiguity, consider a version of Ellsberg's three-color problem. There is an urn containing 120 balls, 40 of which are known to be black (B) and 80 of which are somehow divided between red (R) and yellow (Y), with no further information on the distribution. A ball is to be drawn at random from the urn, and the DM faces a choice among bets paying off depending on the color of the drawn ball. Any such bet may be written as a triple ðu B ; u R ; u Y Þ 2 R 3 where each ordinate represents the payoff if the respective color is drawn. Typical preferences have (1, 0, 0) preferred to (0, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 1) preferred to (1, 0, 1), reflecting a preference for the less ambiguous bets. Notice that these preferences entail a preference to bet on black over red when no bet is made on yellow and a preference to bet on red over black when a bet is also made on yellow (thus violating the sure-thing principle of EU). Now consider a simple dynamic version of this problem. In the dynamic version, there is an interim information stage, where the DM is told whether or not the drawn ball was yellow. The DM is allowed to condition her choice of betting on black or red on this information. In the first choice pair, the bet on black or red is not paired with a bet on yellow, so the choice ''Bet on B'' leads to the payoff vector (1, 0, 0) while the choice ''Bet on R'' leads to payoffs (0, 1, 0). In the second choice pair, a bet on yellow is included, so the choice ''Bet on B'' leads to the payoff vector (1, 0, 1) while the choice ''Bet on R'' leads to payoffs (0, 1, 1). Since the DM can condition on whether or not a yellow ball is drawn, the complete set of pure strategies available in each choice problem is: , then this provides a strong argument that choices in the dynamic version of the Ellsberg problem should be the same as in the original problem since the feasible payoff vectors are the same. This is closely related to ensuring that the value of information is always non-negative, another desirable principle for decision making (see, e.g., [30] ). If choices in the dynamic version of the problem differed from those in the original problem (where the choices are made before the information is revealed) then the DM would strictly prefer to face the original problem, thus declining the (free) information.
What kind of rules for updating ambiguous beliefs imply that the choices in the dynamic version are the same as in the original problem (not only for this example, but in general)? In [10] we provide such rules, and also show that any such rules must depend on the feasible set of payoff vectors available in the problem and/or on an ex-ante optimal act for the problem. To make this clear, consider the following specification of MEU preferences that allow the Ellsberg choices in the example above. For any MEU preference over payoff vectors in R 3 , there exists a compact and convex set of probability measures, C, over the three colors and a utility function, u :
, a set of measures symmetric with respect to the probabilities of red and yellow and consistent with the information that 40 of the 120 balls are black. Observe that, indeed, (1, 0, 0) is preferred to (0, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 1) is preferred to (1, 0, 1) according to these preferences. If we apply full Bayesian updating (Bayesian conditioning of each measure in C) conditional on the event E = {B, R}, the updated set of measures is C E ¼ ða; 1 À a; 0Þja 2 Â Ã È É . According to these updated preferences, ''Bet on B'' is strictly preferred to ''Bet on R'' conditional on learning E = {B, R}, leading (1, 0, 0) to be selected over (0, 1, 0) in choice problem 1, in agreement with the unconditional preferences, but also leading (1, 0, 1) to be selected over (0, 1, 1) in choice problem 2, in conflict with the unconditional preferences. It follows that for an update rule to maintain the choices according to the unconditional preferences for both choice problems, the rule must depend on the feasible set and/or on an ex-ante optimal act. A dynamically consistent update in this example corresponds to Bayesian updating of measures in a particular strict subset of the ex-ante set of measures, specifically the conditional set of measures is C Â Ã g in choice problem 2. This emphasizes that although natural analogues to updating beliefs under EU exist for updating beliefs under ambiguity, dynamic consistency requires novel procedures that operate somewhat differently.
The prior literature on updating ambiguous beliefs in MEU proposes and explores rules that, in fact, fail dynamic consistency for at least some MEU preferences. This literature includes many well-known rules, such as full (or generalized) Bayesian updating, maximum likelihood updating, or Dempster-Shafer updating. Full Bayesian updating calls for updating each measure in a set of priors according to Bayes' rule (see [13, 14, 5, 34, 32, 24, 23, 28, 33, 4] , for papers suggesting, deriving or characterizing this update rule in various settings). Maximum likelihood updating says that, of the set of priors, only those measures assigning the highest probability to the observed event should be updated using Bayes' rule, and the other priors should be discarded (see [7] ). Kriegler [17] advocates a hybrid approach applying full Bayesian updating to a set of measures formed through e -contamination where additionally e is updated through a maximum likelihood procedure. Both full Bayesian and maximum likelihood updating are given an interpretation in terms of epistemic belief hierarchies by Walliser and Zwirn [31] . For Dempster-Shafer updating see [2, 27] . Jaffray [15] suggests that the inconsistency between unconditional and conditional preferences might be resolved in a way that is a compromise between the different preferences. He examines a selection criterion that chooses a plan that is ''not too bad'' in a utility sense according to any of these preferences and is not dominated in that no feasible plan is better according to all the preferences. Nielsen and Jaffray [22] construct algorithms for implementing the approach suggested by Jaffray [15] in the context of risk.
In contrast to this literature, Hanany and Klibanoff [10] identify update rules that are dynamically consistent for any MEU preferences upon observing any non-null event. Given the necessary dependence of the consistent rules on the feasible set and/or an ex-ante optimal act, the practicality of their implementation is an issue. This motivates the present paper, where we provide algorithms for computing the updated beliefs determined by these consistent rules. In developing the algorithms and proving that they implement the various rules, we draw on techniques from convex analysis.
In the next section we describe the framework for our analysis. Section 3 describes algorithms to compute updated beliefs. Section 4 provides a short summary. Proofs are collected in Appendix A. Appendix B collects some useful results from polyhedral theory. Code for an implementation of the algorithms in the paper using Wolfram Mathematica is available as an Online Supplement on the journal webpage or from the authors.
Framework
Consider the set X of all simple (i.e., finite-support) lotteries over a set of consequences Z, a finite set of states of nature S endowed with the algebra R of all events, and the set A of all acts, i.e. functions f : S ? X. Consider a non-degenerate maxmin expected utility (MEU, [6] ) preference relation % over A, for which there exists a compact and convex set of probability measures with a finite set of extreme points, C, and a vonNeumann-Morgenstern (vN-M) EU function, u : X ! R, such that
Let P MEU denote the set of all such preference relations. If % is non-degenerate, C is unique and u is unique (among vN-M EU functions) up to positive affine transformations. As usual, $ and 1 denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of %.
Let N ð%Þ denote the set of events E 2 R for which "q 2 C, q(E) > 0. We limit attention to updating on events that are nonnull in this sense. For E 2 R, let D(E) denote the set of all probability measures on R giving weight 0 to E c . For any q 2 D(S) with q(E) > 0, we denote by q E 2 D(E) the measure obtained through Bayesian conditioning of q on E.
Let B denote the set of all non-empty subsets of acts B # A such that B is convex (with respect to the usual [1] mixtures) and compact with a finite set of extreme points. Elements of B are considered feasible sets and their convexity could be justified, for example, by randomization over acts. Compactness is needed to ensure the existence of optimal acts.
Assume a preference % 2 P MEU , an event E 2 N ð%Þ and an act g 2 A chosen according to % from a feasible set B 2 B before the realization of E (i.e., g % f , for all f 2 B). Denote by T the set of all such quadruples ð%; E; g; BÞ. An update rule is a function U : T ! P MEU , producing for each ð%; E; g; BÞ 2 T a MEU conditional preference, denoted % E;g;B , representable using the same (up to normalization) vN-M utility function u as % and a non-empty, closed and convex set of conditional measures C E,g,B # C E {q E jq 2 C}, with a finite set of extreme points. Such a conditional preference is viewed as governing choice upon the realization of the conditioning event E. Let U Bayes denote the set of all such update rules. Abusing notation in the standard way, x 2 X is also used to denote the constant act for which "s 2 S, f(s) = x. For any f ; h 2 A, we use f E h to denote the act equal to f on E and h on E c , the complement of E. General vectors in R jSj will be called utility acts. If a and b are utility acts, we use a E b to denote the utility act equal to a on E and b on E c . Since S is finite, we sometimes identify probability measures with vectors in R jSj normalized to sum to 1. For an arbitrary convex, compact set of real vectors, A, denote by ext(A) the set of extreme points of A. Let C ¼ extðCÞ and B ¼ extðu BÞ, thus C ¼ coðCÞ and u B ¼ coðBÞ, where co denotes the convex hull operator. This implies that C E is the convex hull of a finite number of points. For each a 2 R jSj and n 2 R, denote the half-space fc 2 R jSj ja Á c P ng by W n a and the hyperplane fc 2 R jSj ja Á c ¼ ng by H n a . As discussed in the introduction, the update rules considered in this paper depend on an initially optimal act g and the feasible set B. Before introducing update rules, we describe a simple algorithm for computing an initially optimal act. 
Proposition 2.1. The act g is optimal in B according to %.
The following example will be used throughout the paper to demonstrate our results. In the next section we analyze the updated ambiguous beliefs in this problem. Throughout the paper we analyze the case where E is observedsimilar analysis, omitted for brevity, can be done for the case where E c is observed.
Computing updated beliefs

Dynamically consistent update rules
Dynamic consistency, an important and intuitive property of update rules, means that initial contingent plans should be respected after receiving information. In our framework, the act g should remain optimal also conditionally. , then g % E;g;B f .
Observe that conditional optimality of g is checked against all feasible acts f such that f = g on E c . Why check conditional optimality only against these acts? Consider an environment where the DM has a fixed budget to allocate across bets on various events. It would be nonsensical (and would violate payoff dominance on the realized event) to require that the ex-ante optimal allocation of bets remained better than placing all of one's bets on the realized event. This justifies the restriction of the conditional comparisons to acts that could feasibly agree on E c . An act f = g on E c will be called comparable to g.
Among rules satisfying desiderata such as dynamic consistency, there are those that are most conservative in the sense of maintaining the most ambiguity in the process of updating. In general, this means that the updated set of measures should be the largest possible subset of C E , in the sense of set inclusion, while still satisfying the desiderata. Examining such rules is particularly illuminating because they reveal the precise extent to which dynamic consistency forces the DM to eliminate measures present in the unconditional set when updating. If, for example, one views full Bayesian updating (updating all measures in the initial set) as ''the right thing to do'' then examining these rules shows how far one must depart from this to maintain consistency. Note that if dynamic consistency is ignored, and all rules in U Bayes are considered, ambiguity maximization would uniquely select full Bayesian updating.
Let us now observe the implications of DC for updating. The following algorithm can be used to compute the set of updated beliefs under the unique ambiguity maximizing update rule (denoted U DCmax ) within the dynamically consistent rules in U Bayes . Having found an initially optimal act g in Step 3.1.A, the algorithm computes in Step 3.1.B the set of feasible utility acts comparable to g.
Step 3.1.C computes Bayesian conditional measures normal to hyperplanes supporting this set at g. Only these measures can be used to evaluate g conditionally if dynamic consistency is required. If we were to stop the algorithm at this point and return coðQ E Þ, this would be a dynamically consistent update rule but need not maximize ambiguity. To maximize ambiguity, Step 3.1.D finds the minimum evaluation of g according to these measures, and computes the updated beliefs as the set of conditional measures that evaluate g at least as high as this minimum.
Algorithm 3.1.
Step 3.1.A: Compute b = u g and o Ã ¼ min q2C P s2S b s q s .
1
Step 3. Step 3.1.C:
Step 3. Example 3.1. We apply the algorithm to our leading example. Since we already have an optimal utility act b = (9, À16, 19, 19) and its value o ⁄ = 1, we start by finding the set L, the extreme points of the set of feasible acts comparable to g. Ið4Þ leaves this set unchanged, so this is L. Note that this set includes the optimal utility act b, the utility act corresponding to the choice of buying the information and investing always in l, and the utility act (À4.75, À4.75, 19, 19) resulting from a convex combination of the no investment option and investing in l without buying the information. Next we find the set C E , the extreme points of the set obtained by Bayesian conditioning of all measures in C (see the top part of Fig Notice that if one adopted this set as the updated ambiguous beliefs, i.e. followed the full Bayesian rule, the optimal choice given E would be not to follow the optimal act and instead invest in l. This would result in the utility act (À6, À6, 19, 19), which is dominated (in every state) by the feasible act invest in l without buying the information. This demonstrates that full Bayesian updating may be an undesirable update rule. In contrast, U DCmax is dynamically consistent, and thus does not suffer from such phenomena. To see this, we continue to follow the algorithm and next find Q E , the extreme points of the set of measures supporting the conditional optimality of g. Since j L j¼ 3; co C E is intersected thrice, to ensure measures that support the feasible set comparable to g. 13.75q 1 À 11.25q 2 P 0, which is not weaker than the restrictions already imposed, so
Note that given these updated ambiguous beliefs, the optimal act is conditionally equivalent to À4.75, which is better than À6, the payment if one invests instead in l. Thus dynamic consistency is satisfied. The example shows that it is necessary to eliminate some of the measures in the original set, in particular all measures that conditionally give weight lower than 0.45 to state 1. When a plan is made initially to follow the optimal act, the updated ambiguous beliefs represented by C E,g,B justify this plan: contingent on learning E, it will be optimal to carry it out.
Note that computing the updated ambiguous beliefs is a hard problem because it involves computing the extreme points of intersections of convex hulls of finite sets of points, which is known to be hard. If these computations could be done efficiently, then all the algorithms in this paper would be polynomial in the size of the problem.
It is also worth noting that in cases where the feasible set has a special structure such that f ; f 0 2 B ) f E f 0 2 B, the restriction f = g on E c in the statement of DC is superfluous, thus the computation of Step 3.1.B can be simplified to L fa 2 Bja ¼ b on E c g. Such feasible sets arise, for example, whenever one starts from a decision tree with branches 1 If g is not known, one can apply Algorithm 2.1 to carry out this step. 2 When computing the extreme points of the intersection of a list of hyperplanes/half-spaces with the convex hull of a finite set of points, this algorithm and all subsequent ones use standard procedures from polyhedral theory (e.g., as in Appendix B) and thus we do not detail these procedures here. 
More robust dynamic consistency
It may be desirable to strengthen dynamic consistency, so that all initially optimal acts comparable to g should remain optimal conditional on E. Axiom 3.2 PFI (Robust dynamic consistency) 3 . For any ð%; E; g; BÞ 2 T , if f 2 B with f = g on E c and f $ g, then f $ E,g,B g.
The following algorithm can be used to compute the set of updated beliefs under the unique ambiguity maximizing update rule (denoted U DC\PFImax ) within the rules in U Bayes satisfying DC and PFI. As in Algorithm 3.1, Steps 3.2.A and 3.2.B find an initially optimal act g, the set of feasible acts comparable to g and the set of measures supporting the conditional optimality of g. Step 3.2.C computes the measures normal to hyperplanes separating the feasible acts comparable to g from the acts strictly better than g. Step 3.2.D uses one of these measures to compute the set of initially optimal acts comparable to g. Step 3.2.E computes the Bayesian conditional measures normal to hyperplanes supporting this set at g. Only these measures can be used to evaluate g conditionally if robust dynamic consistency is required. To maximize ambiguity, Step 3.2.F finds the minimum evaluation of g according to these measures, and computes the updated beliefs as the set of conditional measures that evaluate all initially optimal acts at least as high as this minimum. Step 3.2.C:
Step
Step 3.2.E:
Step 3.2.F: The following example serves to demonstrate the comparative robustness of updating under PFI and DC, as compared to updating under only DC. It also illustrates the algorithm above.
Example 3.2. We apply the algorithm to our leading example. It can be verified that the optimum found using Algorithm 2.1 is unique, thus PFI has no bite. Therefore we modify the example slightly and assume that the cost of buying the information is 2. Applying Algorithm 2.1 again, the previous optimal act -buy the information and invest in n if E and in l if not Eremains optimal. With the new cost, this is an optimal utility act b = (8, À17, 18, 18) with optimal value o ⁄ = 0. The set of feasible utility acts comparable to g now has the extreme points L ¼ fð8; À17; 18; 18Þ; ðÀ7; À7; 18; 18Þ; ðÀ4:5; À4:5; 18; 18Þg. The set of measures supporting the conditional optimality of g now has the extreme points Q E ¼ fð0:5; 0:5; 0; 0Þ; ð0:8; 0:2; 0; 0Þg (see the top part of Fig. 3.2) . Note that the change in L caused a change in Q E . In particular, any conditional measure putting weight less than 0.5 to state 1 now does not support the conditional optimality of g because it becomes worse than (À4.5, À4.5, 18, 18). Observe that coðCÞ \ H o Ã b ¼ fð0:4; 0:4; 0:1; 0:1Þg, so R ¼ fq g g ¼ fð0:4; 0:4; 0:1; 0:1Þg. Next we find J, the extreme points of the initially optimal acts comparable to g. The intersection coðLÞ \ H o Ã q g results in the extreme points {(8, À17, 18, 18), (À4.5, À4.5, 18, 18)}. Since j C j¼ 3, we need 3 more intersections, which leave the set unchanged, so this is J. Note that the second extreme point of the initially optimal acts results from a convex combination of the no investment option and investing in l without buying the information. We move on to compute K E , the extreme points of the set of measures supporting the conditional optimality of all initially optimal acts comparable to g. Since j J j¼ 2 but the intersection based on b 2 J never imposes any restriction, we intersect Q E once, which leads to K E ¼ fð0:5; 0:5; 0; 0Þg (see the top part of Fig. 3.2) . Finally, we compute U E , the set of extreme points of the set of updated beliefs. Observe that initially optimal act, corresponding to the utility act (À4.5, À4.5, 18, 18). Under U DC\PFImax , the updated beliefs will be the same as above because this rule guarantees that all initially optimal acts in co{(8, À17, 18, 18), (À4.5, À4.5, 18, 18)} remain optimal conditionally. However, U DCmax for this case coincides with full Bayesian updating, i.e. results in more conditional measures in the updated set compared to the case with the former initially optimal act. This additional ambiguity would have affected the conditional optimality of the utility act (8, À17, 18, 18), while none of it affects the conditional optimality of (À4.5, À4.5, 18, 18) due to the constancy on E. Incidentally, for U DCmax with the initially optimal act (À4.5, À4.5, 18, 18), in contrast to Example 3.1, Step 3.1.D has an effect: it expands the updated set from coðQ E Þ ¼ cofð0:2; 0:8; 0; 0Þ; ð0:5; 0:5; 0; 0Þg (see the top part of Fig. 3.2) to coðU E Þ ¼ cofð0:2; 0:8; 0; 0Þ; ð0:8; 0:2; 0; 0Þg.
Reference dependent updating
Consider an additional condition which, in the presence of DC, implies PFI and is stronger than PFI only for infeasible acts.
Axiom 3.3. RA (g as a reference act). For any ð%; E; g; BÞ 2 T , if f 2 A with f = g on E c and f $ g, then f % E;g;B g.
One way of viewing RA is as saying that updating must preserve or increase ambiguity affecting g more than ambiguity affecting any act f indifferent and comparable to g. 4 RA has the advantage of simplifying the updated beliefs in the following important special case. When the initially optimal act g is constant (in utilities) on E c , we can use a simple threshold rule based on the probability each measure assigns to E to obtain the updated set. It follows that a sufficient condition for the threshold rule to apply occurs when E c is a singleton, i.e., information is learned one state at a time, a not uncommon occurrence.
The strengthening of PFI to RA does not follow from dynamic consistency considerations, however the condition does not seem unreasonable and has the above-mentioned simplification as its main virtue. In RA, the part of the indifference curve through g agreeing with g on E c is picked out for a special role in updating. This part of the indifference curve may be thought of as the portion where g is being used as a reference act. The axiom requires that g occupy an extremal position in the conditional preference relative to the other elements of this part of the (unconditional) indifference curve (through g) consisting of acts agreeing with g on E c . The following algorithm can be used to compute the set of updated beliefs in this special case under the unique ambiguity maximizing update rule (denoted U DC\RAmax ) within the rules in U Bayes satisfying DC and RA. The key new step that provides the simplification to a threshold rule is Step 3.3.D. This step selects the measures to update by comparing the weight they give to E with q g (E) and updates all measures giving weakly more weight than q
).
Algorithm 3.3
Step 3. Example 3.3. We apply this algorithm also to our leading example. Assume again that the cost of buying the information is 2. Recall the optimal act g = (8, À17, 18, 18) with optimal value o ⁄ = 0 and the measure in R ¼ fq g g ¼ fð0:4; 0:4; 0:1; 0:1Þg, which uniquely separates the feasible acts comparable to g from the acts preferred to g (see Fig. 3.3) . Note that u g is con-
IðsÞ is equivalent to the condition q(E) P q g (E). The unique measure in coðCÞ satisfying this condition is q g , thus U E includes only its Bayesian conditional. Therefore the updated beliefs are represented by In fact, the algorithm producing the threshold rule is valid somewhat more generally than suggested above. It works whenever there is no ambiguity about the conditional expectation of g on E c , in the sense that the initially optimal act g has the same conditional EU on E c according to each measure in C giving positive probability to E 4 An alternative strengthening of PFI is obtained by replacing f % E;g;B g with g % E;g;B f in RA. However, a small modification of the example in the proof of Proposition 13 in [10] can be used to show there is no update rule in U Bayes satisfying the alternative condition (and in fact, no such rule exists in the larger family of update rules that allows updating measures outside C). 
Summary
This paper develops algorithms for updating ambiguous beliefs in the MEU model of decision making under ambiguity. The update rules all satisfy the desirable property of dynamic consistency as was shown in [10] . Some of the rules also satisfy stronger and more robust consistency requirements as well. The algorithms are formulated concisely and are easy to implement, thus making dynamically consistent updating operational in the presence of ambiguity. We close by mentioning two possible directions for future research. First, the algorithms in this paper deal only with finitely generated sets of beliefs and feasible acts. The question of whether these algorithms can be used to approximate dynamically consistent updating for arbitrary convex sets of beliefs or feasible acts is left open.
Second, although MEU is a popular theory of decision making with ambiguity aversion, it is far from the only one (see, among many, [12, 16, 18, 21, 26, 29] ). In [11] we expand the approach in [10] to characterize dynamically consistent update rules for a very broad class of ambiguity averse preferences. Algorithmic implementation in these more general settings is left open as well.
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Appendix A. Proofs and auxiliary lemmata
To conserve space in this appendix, whenever we refer to [10] , we use the abbreviation HK. ¼ coðQ E Þ. The fact that it suffices to apply a finite number of intersections (8a 2 L and not "a 2 u {f 2 Bjf = g on E c }) follows from Proposition A.1 below. Finally, by definition of U DCmax , C E,g,B is the set q 2 C E j
The following proposition shows that algorithms for computing the intersection of a compact, convex set with a finite number of half-spaces or hyperplanes (see e.g. Algorithm B.2 in Appendix B) can also be used to compute the intersection of such a set with an infinite number of half-spaces/hyperplanes, when the latter are defined by normals taken from a compact, convex set having a finite number of extreme points. 
The same is true when substituting W n a with H n a . is the set of Bayesian conditionals on E of K E,g,B , the measures supporting the conditional optimality of all acts initially optimal and comparable to g, defined by
We first show that u J 
. The fact that in Step 3.2.D, it suffices to apply a finite number of intersections (8q 2 C and not "q 2 C) follows from Proposition A.1. Next observe that since
. Again, by Proposition A.1, it is sufficient in Step 3.2.E to compute a finite number of intersections (8a 2 J and not8a 2 u J g B ). Finally, by definition of U DC\PFImax and Proposition A.1, C E,g,B is the intersection of C E and the sets q 2 C E j P s2S ða s À b 2 ÞqðsÞ P 0 È É for all a 2 J.
Lemma A.1 (HK, p. 288, Lemma 3). For ð%; E; g; BÞ 2 T ; Q E;g;B \ arg min q2C R ðu gÞdq -;.
The following proposition is needed for the proof of Proposition 3.3. 
Proof of Proposition A. 
R ðu gÞdp. Since these inequalities are preserved under convex combinations and closure, C 0 E;g;B # C E;g;B and min p2C 0 E;g;B R ðu gÞdp ¼ min p2C E;g;B R ðu gÞdp. Moreover, we show that C E;g;B # C 0 E;g;B . Suppose that C 0 E;g;B -C E;g;B . Since both sets are convex, there existsq 2 C E;g;B n C 0 E;g;B on the boundary of C E,g,B . Thus there existsf 2 J g such thatq 2 arg min p2C E;g;B R ðu f Þdp. Sinceq R C 0 E;g;B , there exists suchf for which R ðu f Þdq < min p2C 0 E;g;B R ðu f Þdp. If there exists h 2 J g convexly related tof on E such that min p2C
Thus for any h 2 J g convexly related tof on E; min p2C 0 E;g;B R ðu hÞdp > min p2C E;g;B R ðu gÞdp. Therefore for any such h and q Ã 2 arg min p2C R ðu hÞdp;
It follows that min p2C
Proof. If u f is constant on E, then C ¼ arg min p2C R ðu f Þdp E and the lemma is trivially true. For the rest of the proof, we assume u f non-constant on E. For such an act f 2 J g , define the function b : ð0; 1Þ ! R at each a > 0 by the solution to min p2C R ðaðu f Þ þ bðaÞÞ E ðu gÞdp ¼ min p2C R ðu gÞdp. Such a function is well-defined because p(E) > 0 for all p 2 C, and thus the left-hand side is strictly monotonic in b(a). Now define the function q : (0, 1) ? C such that, for a > 0; qðaÞ 2 arg min p2C R ðaðu f Þ þ bðaÞÞ E ðu gÞdp. We denote q(a) by q a . First we show that R ðu f Þdq a E is non-increasing with a. Let a 1 > a 2 > 0. Then 5 Without the assumption uðXÞ ¼ R, the set arg min p2C R ðu gÞdp should be replaced everywhere with its superset q 2 Cj R ðu f Þdq P È R ðu gÞdq for all f 2 J g g. As can be shown (proof available from the authors upon request), under the assumption uðXÞ ¼ R, the Bayesian conditionals formed from the two sets are the same. Notice that the latter set depends on E while the former does not.
Z 
ðA:1Þ
Taking the limit as a ? 1 on both sides of (A.1),
a > 0 and each such h a is convexly related to f on E and h a 2 J g . Therefore, in this case, inf p2C
and the lemma is proved. h
Proof of Proposition 3.3. If q(E) = 1 for all q 2 C, then Step 3.3.D produces coðC E Þ ¼ coðCÞ, which by inspection of DC and RA, are the updated beliefs produced by U DC\RAmax in this case. From here on, suppose q(E) < 1 for some q 2 C. Let x E c 2 X be a constant act for which uðx E c Þ ¼ R E c ðu gÞd q E c . We need to prove that C E,g,B has as members the Bayesian updates q E of all
c . We use the second description of C E,g,B presented in Proposition A.2. We first show that measures q that violate (1)- (3) are not updated. Let f 2 J g and let q 2 arg min p2C R ðu f Þdp. Also let b 3 min p2R
Observe that since q g 2 R E;g;B ; q g 2 arg min p2C R ðu gÞdp. Also note that x E c % g implies that b 3 6 uðx E c Þ, which is immediate if q g (E) = 1, and follows also when q 
R ðu gÞdp by q(E) P q g (E) and the property initially proved, so q E 2 C E,g,B .
The proof of case (1) Proof of Lemma A.3. If q(E) = 1, then any f 2 A such that u f = 0 E 1 suffices, because R ðu f Þdq 0 P 0 for all
From here on, suppose q(E) < 1. Consider the set W(q) {q 
Let us now take a normal u f to H. Since H contains W(q), it must be true that 
Consider only pairs (q 1 , q 2 ) for which (P ⁄ ) is feasible. If (P ⁄ ) is unbounded, then add n q 1 + (1 À n)q 2 to A. Otherwise, let (b) Non-extreme Boundary points of C which are convex combinations of two extreme points satisfying condition 1 with the same vector a, and for which condition 2 is satisfied with an equality.
Proof of Proposition A.4. Denote by D the set of measures satisfying (a) or (b). Let C E ¼ fqjq 2 arg min p2C P s2S a s p s for some a 2 u J g and P s2E ða s À b 3 Þq s P 0g. Since condition 2 is equivalent to
). We will show that co(D) = co(C E ). We first show that an updated boundary point must be a proper (positive weight) convex combination of extreme points of C satisfying condition 1 with the same a. Any such boundary point q can be expressed as a proper convex combination of a set A of extreme points of C, i.e. Next we show that for each edge (convex hull of two extreme points entirely on the boundary) of C, the subset of updated points in this edge is convex. By the arguments above, it is sufficient to consider the case where both the edge's vertices satisfy condition 1. Let R be an edge of C, such that one of its vertices, q Now suppose that there exists a point in R other than q 1 , q 2 satisfying condition 1. Let P(R) denote the set a 2 u ff 2 A with f ¼ g on E c gjq 0 2 È arg min p2C P s2S a s p s for all q 0 in Rg. By the arguments above, P(R) is non-empty. For each a 2 P(R), there exists a half-space P s2E ða s À b 3 Þq s P 0 corresponding to condition 2. This half-space does not contain the entire edge R, for if it did, every point in R would get updated, contrary to our assumption. So the intersection between the half-space and R must be a set of the form aq 1 þ ð1 À aÞq 
, and assume by contradiction that q is updated. Then there exists a vector a 2 u {f 2 Bjf = g on E c } such that q 2 arg min p2C P s2S a s p s and P s2E ða s À b 3 Þq s P 0. It follows from the same argument used earlier, that any q 0 2 Q also belongs to arg min p2C P s2S a s p s . Moreover, the half-space corresponding to condition 2 intersects any edge R of Q in co(D 2 (Q) [ D 1 (Q)), so the half-space intersects the whole facet Q in co(D 2 (Q) [ D 1 (Q)). But this contradicts the assumption on q, completing the proof. , for all feasible a, h 1 (a) P 0 and h 2 (a) < 0. Consequently K could be of any sign, depending on the choice of n, so the behavior of the above expression as a function of h 2 (a) depends on the sign of K. If K P 0 (and so K 0 = 1), then the function is non-increasing, so minimization of a a R is equivalent to maximization of K 0 Á h 2 (a). If ) is feasible and bounded with non-negative value. To see that, first observe that K = nh 1 (a) + (1 À n)h 2 (a), and h 1 (a), h 2 (a) P 0, so K P 0. Since q 1 and q 2 satisfy condition 1 with the same a, and since a E b 2 u J g , the second constraint holds. ) is feasible. Since the second constraint holds, K = nh 1 (a) + (1 À n)h 2 (a), and since h 1 (a) P 0, h 2 (a) is bounded from above, and so the program is bounded. Note that since K P 0, K 0 = 1 and the program results in a ⁄ such that
Appendix B. Algorithms from polyhedral theory
This appendix includes several algorithms, known from polyhedral theory [8] , that can be used within the algorithms for computing updated beliefs.
B.1. The irredundancy problem; or, extracting a set's extreme points Given a finite set H # R jSj , the following algorithm can be used to compute the set ext[co(H)]. 
(ii) Find E k ext co D Code for an implementation of the algorithms in the paper using Wolfram Mathematica is available as an Online Supplement at doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2011.06.010 on the journal webpage or from the authors.
